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Any mathematical proof is a game. As a game, it is based on a definite set of rules
of logic reasoning which altogether constitutes the subject of logic.
One of the simplest rules of the theory of logic is a denial of the truth of a given
proposition that is expressed as a sentence. The truth of a proposition has to be denied
by asserting its negation. Assuming, for example, that the proposition p := {Everyone
is wise} (see Ref. [1]) is false, I assert instead s := {Everyone is unwise}. s seems to be
a negation of p. However, s is definitively not the logical negation of p that in logic is
defined as ‘not p’ or ∼p := {the proposition that is true when p is false and false when
p is true} [1,2]. Therefore, s is false if p is true, but not certainly true if p is false, and
hence, s 6= ∼p.
The standard method of asserting the negation of a simple sentence consists in
attaching the word ‘not’ to the main verb of the sentence. However, the assertion of
the negation of a compound proposition (sentence) is not that trivial. Consider the set
of negations within the context of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem [3] (see also Ref. [4]
and Ref. [5] for the notations):
Negation
p := {v1(r)− v2(r) = constant} ⇒
∼p := {v1(r)− v2(r) 6= constant}
q := {ρ(1)
o
(r) = ρ(2)
o
(r)} ⇒ ∼q := {ρ(1)
o
(r) 6= ρ(2)
o
(r)}. (1)
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According to Ref. [6], the Hohenberg-Kohn negation is the compound proposition
∼p&q expressed as the conjunction (indicated by the ampersand sign ‘&’ [2]) of the
two simple propositions, ∼p and q. The proposition ∼p&q is true iff both these simple
propositions are true, i. e.,
∼p := {v1(r)− v2(r) 6= constant} and q := {ρ
(1)
o
(r) = ρ(2)
o
(r)} are both true. (2)
Conversely, the proposition ∼p&q is false iff both these simple propositions are false,
that is,
∼p := {v1(r)− v2(r) 6= constant} and q := {ρ
(1)
o
(r) = ρ(2)
o
(r)} are both false. (3)
Within the context of Ref. [6], what is proved in the original reductio ad absurdum (:=
RAA) proof by Hohenberg and Kohn [3] is that ∼p&q is false. Since the negation of a
false proposition is true and since ∼∼p = p, ∀ p, the true proposition is actually p&∼q
which is
p := {v1(r)− v2(r) = constant} and
∼q := {ρ(1)
o
(r) 6= ρ(2)
o
(r)}. (4)
Absurd: (4) does not have anything in common with the Hohenberg-Kohn RAA proof.
Therefore, the interpretation of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem presented in Ref. [6] is
the authors’ own interpretation that is unsatisfactory.
Actually, Hohenberg and Kohn [3] assert that if the antecedent proposition (hy-
pothesis or premise) ∼p is true then the consequent proposition q is false. In logic,
this is precisely the conditional proposition or implication [1,2]. In the other words,
the Hohenberg-Kohn implication ∼p⇒ q is false. Within the logic theory [2], it means
that this ‘implication is not truth-functional connective’.
Any RAA proof has its own strict rules mainly based on the theory of logical
interference [2]. These rules do not allow too much room in exercising of refuting
a given proposition that contrasts with the suggestion in Ref. [6]. The application
of these rules to the RAA proof of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem is demonstrated in
Ref. [7]: assume a given premise ∼p for the class of many-electron Coulomb systems
and, using the rules of logical derivation, infer those propositions which logically follow
from ∼p, particularly that, ∼q, provided by the Kato electron-nuclear cusp theorem for
many-electron Coulomb systems [8]. These propositions as being authentically true if
the premise is true form the set P1.
∼p is the negation of the proposition q invoked to
build the Hohenberg-Kohn RAA implication and therefore, these two propositions are
contradictory to each other (Ref. [2], p. 37). Hence, P1 is intrinsically incompatible or
‘inconsistent’ (Ref. [2], p. 36ff) with the to-be-refuted premise q. It merely implies that
the to-be-refuted premise cannot be chosen arbitrarily as being a priori contradictory
or incompatible with the set P1.
It is worth finally mentioning a couple of other, less important shortcomings of Ref.
[6]. One is its insufficient logical reasoning. Let us read: “The author (of Ref. [5])
notes that, as the consequence of the Kato cusp condition [3], the external potential can
be uniquely reconstructed from the information contained in the electron density for a
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Coulomb system. ... However, this observation cannot be used to question the validity
of the original reductio ad absurdum (RAA) proof.” Why? And read further: “The
logical outline of the two proofs ... makes it evident that the Kato cusp condition can be
used to demonstrate that the negation of the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem is false.” The
another one is related to the fact that the existence of a certain relationship between
the one-electron densities and external potentials based on the Kato theorem has been
already noticed in the beginning of the eightees by A. J. Coleman, A. S. Bamzai and
B. M. Deb, V. H. Smith Jr.†, and E. Bright Wilson (see Refs. [8-11] in Ref. [5] and
also Ref. [4]).
I gratefully thank all the reviewers and the readers of my early works [5,7] for lively
discussions and invaluable suggestions. I also thank the authors of Ref. [6] for sending
me reprint of their work prior to its publication and mutual exchanging with them my
works [5,7], and would like to express a certain curiosity of their ignorance to apply
in Ref. [6] the well established logical rules of the RAA proof, shortly outlined in my
work [7], that would certainly help me to avoid the publication of the present reply.
Concluding, I would like to quote E. C. G. Boyle who once stated that “it makes all
the difference in the world whether we put Truth in the first or in the second place.”
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